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1. INTRODUCTION
The public sector reforms have been implemented since the 1980 s in
all industrialized countries. The new public management (NPM), which is
rooted in management theory and new institutional economics, has been
"in fashion" in many countries. NPM's philosophy is the beliefthat private
sector management and commercial business practices are superior to
public management and practices.
Accounting is of course not exceptional. The change from cash based
accounting or budgetary accounting to accrual accounting is part of a
broader public sector reform process in the Anglo-Saxon democracies. The
New Zealand Government, the most advanced at national level in accrual
based reporting, has prepared its annual report in accrual base since
1991. Full accrual accounting sytem is able to provide more information
This paper was presented to the 6 th CIGAR Conference at Bocconi University on 5-6
June, 1997.
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than is disclosed under a cash based accounting system in terms of quan-
tity and quality; the latter is a subset of the former. The aims of the in-
troduction of accrual accounting are to facilitate more transparency in
agency performance and to improve public sector efficiency and effective-
ness. However, the introduction is not an end in itself: its value depends
on the level of user's understanding and contribution to decision makings.
It is therefore inappropriate for us to focus on whether accounting system
reform has succeeded or not. In this perspective, a contingency model on
the accounting innovations in the public sector which Liider (1992, 1994)
developed has also the three following limitations, though the model is
not only comprehensive but also applicable to accounting reforms in every
country.
Firstly, his model aims at explaining how the accounting system re-
form, not management system reform, has been determined. Accrual ac-
counting system is, as indicated above, not a fundamental objective but a
process element toward public sector reforms. Indeed, accounting infor-
mation even if in accrual based reporting is a just little useful for citizens
[Alijarde, 1997; Yamamoto, 1997J.
Secondly, Liider has considered the accounting reform at the national
level. In addition to the difference in population between central govern-
ment and local government, local government has a distinct feature of lo-
cal autonomy. Local government in democracies is governed by the princi-
ple of local autonomy. In its governance, self-government and residents'
autonomy are the major rule. The former means that local government is
able to regulate its own affairs, while the latter does that citizens partici-
pate in political decisions. We have to therefore consider the element of di-
rect democracy in reforming in local government.
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Thirdly, his model assumes that full accrual accounting system is bet-
ter than cash accounting and modified cash or accrual accounting sys-
tems. He also implicitly supposes the change to accrual accounting will
surely contribute to improve transparency and to promote efficient use in
the public sector. The New Zealand governments and the executive agen-
cies in the UK have shown the successful results on improving account-
ability and management through the introduction of full accrual account-
ing system. In contrast to these, another approach on fiscal policy (finan-
cial management), operating in a cash based accounting environment, has
been taken in Europe and the US. The member countries of EU must
meet the convergence criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty for the entry
into the Union in 1999. One ofthese criteria is that budget deficit should
be not more than three percent of GDP and its debt should not exceed
sixty percent of GDP. In the US, the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act pro-
vided deficit control mechanism. The act imposed a requirement that pol-
icy change for a particular year does not increase the estimated current
and near term deficits relative to the levels forecast at the beginning of
the current fiscal year. The policy offiscal target or control by caps, for the
present, appears to successfully reduce budget deficit in each country, de-
spite of expenditure control in cash based accounting. Thus, the assump-
tion may need to reconsider.
The above results from different approaches may be supported by an
emerging economic theory, Comparative Institutional Analysis (CIA). CIA
indicates that a diversity of institutional arrangement is possible and the
relative efficiency of various institutions depends on the value of exoge-
nous parameters [Aoki, 1996; Nelson, 1995].
Also, empirical studies of accounting system on financial performance
[Daniels and Daniels, 1991; Yamamoto, 1992] have shown accrual ac-
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counting was little effective to improving performance in the public sector
compared to cash based accounting. Besides Mussari (1995) indicated that
accrual accounting did not directly lead to improve public accountability
in Italian local governments.
In this respect, we will develop, in the next section, an expanded
model in which accounting system is considered a subset of management
system based on a multi-principal and agent model. In Section 3, the pos-
sible scenarios are indicated in the Japanese local governments by using
the expanded model. In Section 4, we describes the emerging reform pol-
icy in an innovative local government. Lastly in Section 5, some conclu-
sions are shown.
2. MODEL
Liider (1994) indicated three major players in accounting reform proc-
ess, the public, politicians and bureaucrats. It is useful that the players
are separated to information provider and information user in terms oflo-
cal autonomy, since citizens or the public have the mandate of direct par-
ticipation. We further divide the players into principal and agent from the
democratic point of view. In this principal-agent relationship, principals
are no doubt citizens (P 1) and legislature (P 2) including an independent
auditor, though legislature is also the agent of citizens. Investors (P 3), as
GASB (1985) described, are also the principal because they provide the
fund to local governments. On the other hand, agent is the head and its
bureaucrats (A) as executive branch.
Under the framework, the structural and obstacle variables, in Liider
model, which affect the player's behavior could be considered environ-
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mental factors (E). The stimulating elements which are not fixed or un-
structured are similarly regarded as thrusts for players: fiscal scandals
for P 1 and P 2, deregulation in capital market for P 3, and fiscal stress or
deficit for A. In addition to this, if we examine an accounting reform proc-
ess, another element should be considered because the reform's outcome is
not only determined by the player's behavior under the given environ-
ment but also influenced by the catalysts (C). Though this framing is a
modified Liider model, as indicated before, we have to define the intended
management system at the same which reflects on the vision of govern-
ance (see Figure 1). While the visions of governance are able to be classi-
fied by dimensions in many ways, in this paper we select two dimensions
from the autonomous point of view in local governments. The first is the
dimension in regard to whether local government is centralized or empow-
ered (decentralized). The second is the dimension as to whether residents
have the full power in policy decisions or not. By using two dimensions,
four governemnt types are determined (see Table 1).
The empowered and direct participative type has the strong citizens
and is regarded as a democratic government. The second type of empow-
ered and indirect participative one has an accurate representative charac-
ter, hence it is a representative government or an agreement (conflict re-
solving) government. The empowered and market-driven type corre-
sponds to are-inventing governmemt whose vision is the NPM. The
fourth type operates under the entrepreneurship or centralized and mar-
ket-driven principle; this type is an entrepreneur government or a con-
stitutional government. In this case centralized nature means that cen-
tral government has controlled local governments or the head (governor
or mayor) oflocal government has a strong leadership.
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Figure I-a. Multi - Principal and Agent Model
Figure I-b. Relationship with Governance and Reform's Outcome
Each type has a dominant player; citizens in the democratic govern-
ment, legislature in the representative democratic one, investors in the
reinventing, and executive in the entrepreneur or constitutional govern-
ment. Responding to the government vision, the most fitting management
and accounting system are also selected. In the democratic government,
participative management matches the combination of budgetary (cash)
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Table I. Governing Types and Management / Accounting
Player Thrust Catalyst Principle Governance Management Accounting
PI Fiscal External Citizen's Decentralized Participative Cash Accounting
Scandal Monitoring, Participation (Empowered) Management and
and Direct Social Reporting
Disclosure Participation
P2 Fiscal External Representativeness Decentralized Accountable Accrual
Scandal Monitoring, and Indirect Management Accounting
Participation
Disclosure -
Mutual Agreement Coordination Cooperative Cash Accounting
(Consensus) Management and
Segment Reporting
P3 Market Big Bang IMarket Decentralized NPM Accrual
Force in Capital Mechanism and Market Accounting
Market
A Fiscal Bandwagon Conswnerism Entrepreneurship NPM Accrual
Stress Accounting
-_.
Enforcement Rationalization Constitution Balanced Cash Accounting
(Law) (Centralized Budget and
and Supplementary
Market) Accrual Accounting
based accounting and social reporting as a satellite account since the av-
erage citizen has little knowledge about business accounting. The repre-
sentative government needs to control the executive branch and to coordi-
nate the conflicting matters. Accrual accounting is a useful tool for the
oversight bodies to control the financial management. It assists them to
take the less biased and less creative financial information about the ex-
ecutive's activities, if the level of understanding among them is signifi-
cantly high as users. In order to reach a mutual consent, cooperatism is
adaptable and matching to cash accounting with segment reporting by
district, class, and generation such as generation acoounting. In the mar-
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ket-driven and entrepreneur governemnts, the corresponding NPM
matches accrual accounting which is used in the private sector. As the
constitutional government requires the balanced budget in the longer
terms, cash accounting system has to be supplemented by accrual ac-
counting in the limited areas such as pension fund.
Table 1 shows the interrelationships between accounting system and
other elements. We can understand from this table why the introduction
of accrual accounting system has produced good results in New Zealand
while the same introduction has little contributed to improving transpar-
ency in Italian local government. The table also explains the reason why
local governments in the UK adopted the modified accrual accounting in
the Thatcher's three successive administrations. The successful results in
New Zealand was caused by the matching among interrelated elements in
governance. NPM operates in market mechanism. Accrual accounting in
the private sector should be transfered to the public sector. Simultane-
ously citizens seem to act as customers to government rather than partici-
pants. In the UK the conservative new right policy was implemented to
accomplish local autonomy as financial independent organization by cen-
tral interventions such as restricting the spending [Elcock, 1994]. In this
environment, focused information is spending in cash based accounting,
not cost in accrual accounting.
3. PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS IN JAPANESE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Political System
The Japanese local governments are organized into two tiers, prefec-
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tures and municipalities. Prefectures include forty-seven administrative
divisions. Municipalities are basic local public entities and are classified
into cities, towns and villages by the criteria of population and urban ac-
tivities.
Each of the forty-seven prefectures has a governor and a unicameral
assembly, both elected by direct popular vote every four years. Like the
prefectures, municipalities are self-governing units administered inde-
pendently and each municipality has its own elected mayor and assembly.
Thus local governments have two principal organizations: the assembly
as the legislature and the chief executive officer as their executive. It is
known as the "president system" or the "chief system".
Though local assemblies are the right to decide, only the matters of
special importance such as local regulations and budget are determined
by the assembly and other decisions are within the power of the chief ex-
ecutive. Japan has a centralized rather than federal system of govern-
ment, even though the Constitution provides the basic principle of local
autonomy. Local governments largely depend on central government both
administratively and financially. The national ministries have the
authority to intervene significantly in local government. Especially in fi-
nancial autonomy, central government has a great central power through
the financial distribution system (Figure 2). While the ratio of national
taxes to local taxes is approximately 2 to 1, the ratio of national expendi-
tures to local expenditures is conversely about 1 to 2. This reverse figure
is caused by two reasons. The first is that a fixed percentage of national
taxes are provided as local allocation taxes to local governments for unre-
stricted use. The second is that the central government grants subsidies
to local governments for specific purposes.
-69-
278
Taxes Paid
Ai
l
Distribution by
Local Allocation Tax
["-=~~:;~:------------------------------------.
I
I
B
..............\ Distribution by
! B !!-----=-===:...::..:....-~
! "--__--,..J. ..1 National Subsidiesl ,.
......................................................····G~~~;:;;~;;t··S~~t~~··· ..······..········..····..········· ,
'-----~ Services returned to the peopl~----'
Figure 2. Exchange of Funds Between the Central and Local Governments
Note
I: N:L=2:1
2: N .. A : L + A = I : I
3: N-(A+B):L+A+B=I:2
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Backgrounds
The centralized unitary system resulted in standardization and
catching up the developed countries in people's lives among the different
local governments. On the other hand, the unitary system by central gov-
ernment gradually does not cope with the varied needs of citizens. Rather
the innovative local governments have anticipated national policies, for
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example, making free of charge in medical care for the elderly (now a
small part of the care cost is burden on them) and regulations on pollu-
tion.
The accumulated broad will, which would like to replace the present
centralized system with the decentralized system, passed the Decentrali-
zation Promotion Law in 1995. Decentralization moved from the debating
stage to the implementation stage by this legislation. Since the decen-
tralization delegates central functions to local functions, local govern-
ments need to operate their functions in more independently. In other
words, more self-determination is theoretically required for them more
self-responsibility. As for the former, the skills for policy makings and fi-
nancial management are demanded and the latter requires an independ-
ent control or oversight body in place of the tight control by central gov-
ernment. These are the first thrust for public sector reforms. The next
thrust is the financial stress in local governments. The share of local
bonds of total revenues in local finance has expanded every year since
1990, it accounts for 16.7 percent in 1995. The outstanding local debts at
the end of 1995 are approximately $ 1,000 billion. The stress in local pub-
lic finance demands efficient using of public money or cost savings to local
governments. The third thrust is the fiscal scandals. They are spending
which local bureaucrats used the travelling and meeting expenses to
other unfair objectives such as private entertainments and meeting with
central bureaucrats at the highest restaurants. The Hokkaido prefecture
is the worst in spending the unfair objectives which came to the surface in
1995. Its expenses amounted to $20 million. The local regulations con-
cerning disclosure of information that preceded the law by central govern-
ment, also assists citizens to check and detect the unfair matters. These
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scandals have not only made citizens more interesting in activities of the
local government, but required more transparency in implementing proc-
ess. In Hokkaido prefecture the number which people demanded for audit
to inspection commissioners increased at fifteen times in a few years (1 in
1993 to 15 in 1996).
Catalysts
This year may be the first one in the Japanese local finance reforms.
Two major catalystic policies have been proposed by the Hashimoto Ad-
ministration. The first is the introduction of external auditing to local gov-
ernments which are every prefecture and the large cities. At present the
inspection commission system is established by the Local Autonomy Law.
The commission consists of four persons appointed by the chief executive
in case of prefecture, two from the assembly members, two from the in-
formed persons. The office is independent of the chief executive though it
belongs to the executive. However most of the informed have the back-
grounds of its own government. Table 2 shows the backgrounds of com-
missioners in all prefectures. The new external auditing will be done in
Table 2. Backgrounds of Inspection Commissioners
( number and percent)
Background 1995. II (A) 1996.7 (B) (B) I (A)
Assembly member 94 (50.0) 94 (50.0) 1.00
Retired Official 74 (39.3) 64 (34.0) 0.86
The Informed 20 (10.6) 30 (16.0) 1.50
Total 188 (100.0) 188 (100.0) 1.00
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the annual contract with the chief executive by the person fulfilled one of
the following conditions:
• having the qualification ofcertified public accountant
• having the qualification oflawyer
• having the experience of auditing in central or local government
Since the new system strengthens independency and professionality
in oversighting the executive, it would not only contribute to improve
transparency but also to check the unfair behavior in local finance.
The second catalyst is the freeing policy of capital market in Japan.
The policy intends to make the capital market global, fair and free by the
21 st century. It is a comprehensive and drastic change in a short period,
therefore, called as "Japanese Big Bang". The Big Bang will inevitably af-
fect on public financial market which is now controlled under the Fiscal
Investment and Loan Program (FILP). The FILP is greatly funded from
the Postal Savings Fund and the Social Welfare Fund (see Figure 3). As a
result, the Postal Savings and Postal Life Insurance Services, and the
Welfare Insurance Service as the main sources ofFILP are the candidates
for privatization. Ifthese services are privatized by the freeing policy, the
local bonds will lose the safety and reliable creditor. Under the present
system, local governments are guaranteed for meeting their financial
needs by issuing local bonds as a substitute for the approvals of the Minis-
ter of Home Affairs. The privatized Postal Saving and Welfare Insurance
services will invest their funds in market mechanism. If the regulation on
issuing local bonds are also removed, the same superior conditions in local
bonds, which any local government regardless of financial state can fi-
nance at the same lower rate than private finance, will disappear. Local
governments will be required to disclose their financial statements in the
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same business style as private companies, that is, accrual accounting.
Possible Scenarios
We now come back to the multi-principal and agent model. According
to the model, major players in public sector reforms are citizens, legisla-
ture, investors and executive including bureaucrats. The Japanese citi-
zens gradually have the power to check the local government because the
local regulations on disclosure of information gives a tool to open the gov-
ernment. A voluntary non-profit oversight body, Citizen's Ombudsman,
has achieved successful results on detecting many unfair matters by using
the regulation. Though the new proposed external auditing would assist
the body to check local government, the body still focuses on checking the
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unfair or illegal behavior rather than participating in decision making or
evaluating the policy. Also many people are little interested in paricipa-
tion or policy making.
On the other hand, assembly members, the agents as citizens, have a
limited mandate because of president system in local government, which
is different from parliamentary system in central government. At the
same time, the member organization is biased in representativeness; mi-
nor groups in population are in the majority of assembly members!. Citi-
zens little trust assembly members. We are therefore unable to consider
citizens and legislature dominant players.
Another principal of executive, investors, have a possibility to playa
significant role if the complete freeing of capital market would be imple-
mented. The privatization of Postal Services including Postal Savings and
Postal Insurance Services is now a hot political issue in the public sector
reform. The Commission for Public Sector Reforms has suggested that the
Postal Services should be transfered to a public company which is inde-
pendent of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. The restructur-
ing in public finance, as indicated above, produce a competitive environ-
ment in bonds market. In this case, the local government would prepare
and disclose its financial statements in accrual based accounting whether
it prefers or not, because investors will require the same disclosure as pri-
vate companies. The possibility of this scenario surely depends on the re-
sult offinancial market reforms.
Lastly, the chief executive and bureaucrats as agents are the strong
power, because the chief executive has leadership under the direct elec-
tion system. In contrast to the central government", in which bureaucrats
are most influential in policy making, the chief executive as an elected
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politician has more power than bureaucrats especially in strategic policy
making. It is never accidental that the innovative policies such as infor-
mation disclosure and preserving traditional scenes are implemented in
advance of the central government. In this respect the chief executive
holds an important player, and can lead the reform. However its goal is
not uniquely determined.
Whether the intended governance is empowered and market type or
centralized and market one produces the different financial management
model. The former type is NPM accompanied with accrual accounting,
while the latter is the balanced budget system based on cash based ac-
counting. The traditional political culture, which is centralized and gov-
erned by the bureaucrats majored in law, evidently conflicts with NPM.
The lower influence by accountants to policy making would accelate the
difficulty to introduction of NPM. Such restriction may reduce the suc-
cessful probability of the reform based on NPM. While the only hopeful
catalyst is a bandwagon effect which management system could be trans-
fered through mutual interactions with organizations adapting NPM, its
reforming process will become a long journey.
On the other hand, balanced system is more acceptable to Japanese
political system, because it focuses on spending not quality of services or
customers and had been repeatedly used as the administrative reform. Its
objective is not only definite in quantity but also becoming visible in short
period, it therefore appeals to citizens and politicians. Restructuring of
government organizations which includes separation of some executive
functions to independent bodies has surely a symbolic influence in provid-
ing the image of efficient government to citizens. As a process of restruc-
turing, the newly established independent bodies may operate under the
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management principle of private sector. In this case, even though partly,
accrual accounting would be introduced to the local governments. Conse-
quently, the scenario which local governmwnts will have cash based ac-
counting with partly accrual accounting most likely occurs.
4. NEW TRENDS FOR REFORMS
The new approach is implemented in some advanced local govern-
ments, though it does not completely adopt NPM. Mie Prefecture Govern-
ment at the middle Japan began the administrative reform in 1995 under
the political leadership of Governor Kitagawa. The basic philosophy con-
sists ofthe following ideas :
• residents oriented
• objective oriented
• value focused
• result oriented
• total system approach
These ideas are similar to NPM because the reform has been sup-
ported by a private consulting company which intends to transfer NPM to
the public sector. The company recommends Reinventing Government
[Osborne and Gaebler, 1992] as the reform model. However the philoso-
phy lacks two elements ofNPM, that is, market mechanism and empow-
erment. As Governor indicates, the center of reform is the project evalu-
ation system (see Figure 4). The system consists offive processes:
1. Making tree consisting of mission, policy, program and project (Fig-
ure 5)
2. Define objectives
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3. Establish outcome measures
4. IdentifY the project in two dimensions of cost and outcome
5. Compare with other projects of different policies.
The remarkable points are the third, fourth and fifth processes. The
result by a project is evaluated in terms of outcome, not output or activity.
The evaluation manual describes an example in case of street cleaning
project; outcome is the degree of street cleaness while output is the dis-
tance of street cleaned up. Each project of the program that outcome
measures are established is placed in two dimensions (see Figure 6). The
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Figure 6. Positioning of Projects
relation between outcome and cost is illustrated according to the decreas-
ing principle of marginal utility. The point E is the ideal position, while
projects located at other points in the dotted should be improved. The pro-
ject pointed at A should be more expanded or progressed, in case of point
B outcome should be more increased. On the other hand, at the point C
cost reduction has to be done while at the point D both of outcome and cost
should be improved.
The most innovative process is in the last process. All projects from
different programs are placed in two dimensions of cost and degree of ex-
pected outcome (see Figure 7). Here cost is measued by adding budget for
the project to personnel cost which is calculated as required time multi-
plied by standarized wage rate. The degree of expected outcome is defined
as the allowance for outcome improvement [(intented outcome-present
outcome) / present outcome] multiplied by the weighting coefficient that
means the degree of contribution to the related program. As shown in Fig-
ure 7, every project is classified into four blocks, A, B, C and D. Block A is
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the area which more resources should be allocated while block D should
be restructured. On the other hand, block B should be improved inten-
sively and block C should be reviewed in terms of cost reduction.
The evaluation system in Mie Prefecture has made progress in plan-
ning and budgeting, however, differs, if we compare to the experiment in
Kagawa Prefeture at southwest Japan in 1970, in the following points:
1. Mie Prefecture is led by strong political leadership, while Kagawa's
case was implemented as an experiment.
2. Mie Government is supported by a private management consultant in
contrast to the central involvement of the Economic Planning Agency
(EPA) in Kagawa Government.
3. Evaluation is planning to be implemented at budgeting and accom-
plishing stages in Mie, while Kagawa focued on budgeting stage.
Despite of many improvement, the innovation in Mie Prefecture has
some critical limitations that Planning, Programming and Budgeting Sys-
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tem (PPBS) had in essence. It focuses on management within govern-
ment, hence citizen's participation in management and accountability to
citizens is little regarded in spite of customer oriented principle. From
this point, the innovation may be called as a closed reform system. An-
other limitation is the definition of cost which is measured in cash based
accounting. Let's consider the case of comparing two projects that have
the same objective but are classified to different project groups: the pro-
ject X is accompanied with large investment, while the project Y only
needs operating fund. Even though both projects would be ranked as the
same degree of expected outcome, in terms of measured cost project X is
located at right side of project Y. In the extreme case, project X may be
ranked at D while project Y at A. It is apparently misleading in efficiency
for resource allocation as far as finance by debt is allowed, though the pre-
sent system has a merit to restrain capital spendings.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed Liider's contingency model in terms of govern-
ance. Multi-principal and agent model was useful for explaining plural
reforms in the public sector. Accrual accounting adapts to NPM which is
decentralized and market oriented management for governance. However
its merits are limited unless interrelated management policies will be si-
multaneously introduced because of institutional complimentarity. New
Zealand government has been using accrual accounting as a subset of
NPM. As the Comparative Institutional Analysis indicates, in case of pub-
lic sector reforms accrual based accounting is not always uniquely deter-
mined system for public management. Actually the member countries of
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EU now have controlled public spending in cash based accounting.
Japanese local governments are also implementing public sector re-
forms under the same fiscal conditions. The most probable scenario for ac-
counting reform is cash based accounting with supplementary accrual ac-
counting, since budget balanced financial management has the least im-
pediment to adapt at once for the executive who is the most powerful
player in the model. An innovative approach which is a hybrid model of
NPM and PPBS is a ambitious one because its focus is not output in NPM
but outcome. Whether the approach will produce successful result or
repeat the same failure of measuring outcome in PPBS is uncertain. The
former may be caused when the evaluation system will be improved by
not only adapting accrual accounting but also incorporate citizen's partici-
pation. The latter has a significant probability, however, the reforming
process may continue so far as political support by the chief executive has
been kept and efficiency has been improved whether realistically or sym-
bolically.
Anyway it is evident that performance evaluation will be advanced in
the Japanese local governments under the pressure of efficiency and the
needs of transparency from citizens. Accrual accounting will be surely in-
troduced comprehensively to the Japanese central and local governments
in a long range, even though it will not bring about in the near future. The
recent reforming plan, which central government will be separeted into
policy unit and implementing unit as in the UK, may trigger the introduc-
tion of accrual accounting to the implementing units.
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NOTES
1. The share of members from primary sector in towns and villages is about fifty percent
despite ofonly five percent in population.
2. According to a public opinion poll, people placed the strongest power in policy making
as follows: bureaucrats (37.0%), politicians (24.3%), industry (15.5%), public opinion
(7.2%).
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Accounting System Reform and Public
Management in Local Governments
--Is it possible to integrate the reforms for improving
public accountability with those of public management? --
Kiyoshi Yamamoto
Abstract
The new public mangement (NPM) has now been in fashion in many
developed countries. The change from cash accounting to accrual
accounting is considered an important tool in NPM. The New Zealand
Government and the executive agencies in the UK transfered to accrual
based budgeting and accounting, while the member countries of EU and
the US Government control the expenditures in cash based. This paper
aims to explain why the different approaches are adopted in public sector
reforms in terms of comparative institutional analysis. Firstly, a multi-
principal and agent model, which expands the contingency model in
accounting reforms into the arena of management reforms, is presented.
By using the model, the reforms in the Japanese local governments are
examined and their possible reforming scenarios are indicated; the
reforms have the possibility of improving accountability and efficiency
when NPM would be integrated with Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System.
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